BABY M: A NON-CONTRACT CONTRACT CASE
Wi/fredo Caraballo*
I

INTRODUCTION

Surrogacy contracts for money are illegal and contrary to the
public policy of the State of New Jersey. This is the conclusion
reached by the New Jersey Supreme Court in the long awaited
decision in In re Baby M.' The court found that the payment provision in the contract was illegal because it violated the New
Jersey statute prohibiting the exchange of money for the adoption of a child,2 and because it was inconsistent with the public
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I In reBaby M, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988). This is the most celebrated
of the so-called surrogate contract cases.
William Stern and Mary Beth Whitehead, residents of NewJersey, entered into
an agreement, with the aid of the Infertility Center of New York, so that Mrs.
Whitehead would bear Mr. Stern's child. Mrs. Whitehead was to be artificially inseminated with Mr. Stern's sperm. She obligated herself to give Mr. Stern custody
of the infant conceived through this arrangement. Mrs. Whitehead was to give up
all parental claims to the infant, and, in return, she was to be paid a fee of$ 10,000.
While Mrs. Whitehead's husband was a party to the contract, Mr. Stern's wife was
not. It was the specific intent of the parties that Mrs. Stern would subsequently
adopt the infant. Mrs. Whitehead changed her mind, however, and desired to keep
custody of the infant. Contrary to the agreement, Mrs. Whitehead named the baby
Sara Elizabeth, while Mr. Stern named her Melissa. Id. at 411-15, 537 A.2d at 123536.
While the court speaks of the arrangement as a "surrogacy contract" and refers
to the mother as a surrogate mother, it stated that "the natural mother [is] inappropriately called the 'surrogate mother.' " Id. at 411, 537 A.2d at 1234.
2 See N.J. S"AT. ANN. § 9:3-54 (West Supp. 1988). This section provides:
a. No person, firm, partnership, corporation, association or agency shall
make, offer to make or assist or participate in any placement for adoption and in
connection therewith
(1) Pay, give or agree to give any money or valuable consideration, or assume
or discharge any financial obligation; or
(2)
Take, receive, accept or agree to accept any money or any valuable consideration.
b. The prohibition of subsection a. shall not apply to the fees or services of
any approved agency in connection with a placement for adoption, nor shall such
prohibition apply to the payment or reimbursement of medical, hospital or other
similar expenses incurred in connection with the birth or any illness of the child, or
to the acceptance of such reimbursement by a parent of the child.
c. Any person, firm, partnership, corporation, association or agency violating
this section shall be guilty of a high misdemeanor.
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policy that custody be determined by the best interests of the
child.'
The first step in the court's analysis was the determination
that the contract was illegal based on its position that despite an
attempt to disguise the nature of the transaction, the arrangement between the Whiteheads and Mr. Stern4 was clearly one intended as "a private placement adoption for money." ' 5 In the
court's view, the entire contract was simply a clever attempt to
get around the adoption statutes."
Language in the opinion appears to suggest that a surrogacy
contract which is not for money would be permissible. ChiefJustice Wilentz, writing for a unanimous court, concluded:
We have found that our present laws do not permit the surro-

gacy contract used in this case. Nowhere, however, do we find
any legal prohibition against surrogacy when the surrogate
mother volunteers, without any payment, to act as a surrogate
and is given the right to change her mind and to assert her
parental rights. Moreover, the Legislature remains free to
deal with this most sensitive
issue as it sees fit, subject only to
7
constitutional constraints.
Beyond the statutory analysis, the court took a second step and
concluded that the pre-birth determination of custody violates the
Baby .11, 109 N.J. at 434, 537 A.2d at 1246.
The court addressed the fact that Mrs. Stern was not a party to the contract:
Although Mrs. Stern was not a party to the surrogacy agreement, the
contract gave her sole custody of the child in the event of Mr. Stern's
death. Mrs. Stern's status as a nonparty to the surrogate parenting
agreement presumably was to avoid the application of the baby-selling
statute to this arrangement.
Id. at 412, 537 A.2d at 1235 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-54 (West Supp. 1988)).
See supra note 2 for text of pertinent statute.
5 Baby 11, 109 N.J. at 425, 537 A.2d at 1241. The court's full statement was:
Mr. Stern knew he was paying for the adoption of a child; Mrs. Whitehead knew she was accepting money so that a child might be adopted;
the Infertility Center knew that it was being paid for assisting in the
adoption of a child. The actions of all three worked to frustrate the
goals of the statute. It strains credulity to claim that these arrangements, touted by those in the surrogacy business as an attractive alternative to the usual route leading to an adoption, really amount to
something other than a private placement adoption for money.
Id. at 424-25, 537 A.2d at 1241.
As stated by the court:
This is the sale of a child, or, at the very least, the sale of a mother's
right to her child, the only mitigating factor being that one of the purchasers is the father. Almost every evil that prompted the prohibition of
the payment of money in connection with adoptions exists here.
Id. at 437-38, 537 A.2d at 1248.
7 Id. at 468-69, 537 A.2d at 1264.
3
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public policy of the state. When a custody dispute arises, public policy requires it to be adjudicated on the basis of the child's best interests rather than the private contractual arrangement.
The question this comment addresses is whether the court's
suggestion that a surrogacy contract without the exchange of money
is not prohibited may survive its determination that public policy
requires custody disputes to be decided by the best-interests-of-thechild standard. My analysis of the Baby M opinion suggests that the
implementation of public policy regarding custody inescapably
leads to the conclusion that all surrogacy arrangements are unenforceable, even if they do not involve the exchange of money.
The term "contract" is generally used to describe an agreement
between parties which sets up mutual rights and obligations. The
corresponding rights and obligations must be enforceable in order
to find that a contract exists. 8 Unenforceable arrangements are not

contracts, they are simply unenforceable agreements. If the surrogate mother is free to change her mind about granting custody of
the child to the father, then the arrangement involves nothing more
than a statement by her of her present intent to make a giftW in the
future. Custody of the newborn is the gift to be made. Can the
parties accomplish by gift what they may not arrange for via
contract?
II

TERMS OF THE GIFT

What conditions would the parties to a surrogacy arrangement wish to set down in order to give effect to their wishes?
The conditions will be determined by their respective goals.
The father's goal is to obtain custody of the child. He will
want to assure himself of the fact that the woman inseminated
with his sperm is healthy and that she will continue to remain
healthy during the course of her pregnancy. He will want to receive some assurances that the woman is sufficiently stable so
that she will not change her mind about giving up the child.
The surrogate's goal is to perform a good deed. She introduces herself into the situation as someone who understands
another's need to be a parent and wishes to share the gift of life
8 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981). "A contract is a promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the
performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty." Id.
9 The term "gift" is descriptive of tie transfer involved. [he donor transfers a
right freely and without a legal obligation to do so. A gift is not effective until the
transfer is actually made. See Bi.,c's Lxw DICTIONARY 619 (5th ed. 1979).
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with others.' To achieve these goals, the parties will wish to
reach a basic agreement that reflects their wishes.''
The father will want the surrogate to agree to the following:
1. The surrogate agrees to undergo a physical examination.
2
2. The surrogate agrees to a psychological examination.'
3. The surrogate agrees to be artificially inseminated."1
4. The surrogate agrees to be under the care of, and adhere
to the instructions of an obstetrician.
5. The surrogate agrees that the child will be4 turned over to
the father at birth, or shortly thereafter.'
To avoid violating the principles announced in Baby M, the
agreement must also provide that:
1. The surrogate has the right to change her mind
and de5
cide not to surrender the child to the father.'
2. The surrogate volunteers to undertake the arrangement
without any payment.
While the parties will wish to avoid the conclusion that their
arrangement includes an exchange of money, there are several economic considerations. Who will pay for the various examinations?
Who will pay for the insemination procedure? Who will pay for the
health expenses during pregnancy and for the birth costs? Should
the surrogate be paid for time lost from work or for childcare if she
has other children at home? The agreement should be supervised
by an attorney. Who will pay the attorney costs? Will payment of all
or any of these costs by the father lead to the conclusion that consideration has been paid by the father in exchange for the child?' The
1(1 The New Jersey Supreme Court discussed the positive motives of a surrogate
mother as well as the money factor. BabY 11, 109 N.J. at 438-39, 537 A.2d at 124849. See also id. at 413, 537 A.2d at 1236. "Mrs. Whitehead's response apparently
resulted from her sympathy with family members and others who could have no
children (she stated that she wanted to give another couple the 'gift of life').
Id.
II The Stern-Whitehead agreement will not be addressed directly since the
court has declared that particular agreement to be invalid.
12 The mental health of the surrogate is a critical concern. ChiefJustice Wilentz
makes it clear that an agreement that does not allow the mother the right to change
her mind would not be valid. Consequently, the father will want to have the surrogate's stability tested to protect himself against her changing her mind.
1:3 This particular provision could prove to be especially difficult since it might
take several attempts to achieve a pregnancy.
14 The parties will need to agree to comply with all of the relevant statutory
provisions concerning termination of parental rights and adoption.
15 Baby .11, 109 N.J. at 468-69, 537 A.2d at 1264. For a discussion concerning
the adoption phase of surrogacy arrangements, see infra note 28 and accompanying
text.
'6 See N.J. SrAr. ANN. § 9:3-54 (West Supp. 1988) (prohibiting the exchange of
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courts or the legislature will need to give guidance for these questions, should there ever be a surrogate agreement that does not violate public policy.
The agreement must also deal with controversial issues such as
the possibility of an abortion. This is necessary because it is possible to discover conditions for which one or more of the parties may
wish an abortion. 7 Moreover, the parents may differ on the question of the morality or propriety of abortion.'" What if the father
dies prior to the birth? Who makes the decisions concerning lifethreatening conditions? What, if any, is the role of the husband of
the surrogate mother? What, if any, is the role of the wife of the
genetic father? Who, at least in the situation of the in vitro fertilization of her egg with the father's sperm, is the mother of the child?'
Each of these questions present formidable obstacles, but none
necessarily leads to the conclusion that an agreement may not be
reached. While the task of answering these and other questions is
awesome, the parties may nevertheless reach a satisfactory arrangement. However, the Baby M decision requires that the terms of the
agreement must also withstand the scrutiny of the public policy
analysis which is independent of the economic issues. These interesting questions may be moot if public policy forbids all surrogacy
arrangements.
money for an adoption). See also supra note 2 for text of statute. The cited language
also seems to imply that the exchange of money is also prohibited for reimbursing
costs unless it is done through an approved agency. While this issue may be worth
pursuing, it is outside the scope of this comment.
17 Amniocentesis makes possible the discovery of congenital defects. The possibility of such a finding is that the parties will specifically have to provide for it in the
agreement.
I An interesting question arises concerning whether the parties may contract
away the mother's right to choose to abort the fetus, as the law presently provides.
The moral implications are beyond the scope of this comment. It is, however, difficult to imagine a court enforcing an agreement denying the mother the right to
abort. Simultaneously, the implications for those whose religion forbids abortion
are immense.
1'0 There are several different possibilities regarding surrogacy:
1. Father's sperm; wife's egg; implantation in a third person who will
be the host mother.
2. Father's sperm; third party's egg; wife is implanted with fetus after it
is fertilized in vitro.

3.

Woman is artificially inseminated with sperm from third party donor
with the intent to raise the child as her husband's.
Each of these possibilities raises questions of custody as well as questions of maternity and paternity.
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PUBLIC POLICY

In addition to concluding that the Stern-Whitehead arrangement was in fact a case of baby buying, the court further held
that:
The surrogacy contract's invalidity . . . is further underlined
when its goals and means are measured against New Jersey's
public policy. The contract's basic premise, that the natural
parents can decide in advance of birth which one is to have
custody of the child, bears no relationship to the settled
law
2
that the child's best interests shall determine custody. 0
That public policy is an appropriate consideration in the area of
contract law is not disputed. 2 1 The task is to delineate the relevant
policy. Chief Justice Wilentz posited that this task is a simple one:
2o Baby 11, 109 NJ. at 434, 537 A.2d at 1246.
21 Professor Corbin states:
There is still another source of "illegality," besides statute and judicial
decisions. That source is the great common background of life from
which come both legislation and common law. It is the prevailing practices of the community of people and their notions as to what makes for
the general welfare. Bargains are judged by the folkways and mores of
the time. A bargain may be illegal because it is contrary to "Public Policy" as that is understood by the judges and administrative officers.

6A A.

CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §

1374, at 6 (1962).

"Judicial refusal to en-

force a promise because it violates some standard of public policy has early roots in
the common law." C. KNAPP & N. CRYSTAL, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAw 577 (2d
ed. 1987).
This principal is carried forward into our modern law of contracts in section
178 of the Second Restatement of Contracts, which states:
(1) A promise or other term of an agreement is unenforceable on the
grounds of public policy if legislation provides that it is unenforceable
or the interest in its enforcement is clearly outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy against the enforcement of such terms.
(2)
In weighing the interest in the enforcement of a term, account is
taken of
(a) the parties justified expectation,
(c) any special public interest in the enforcement of the particular term.
(3)
In weighing a public policy against enforcement of a term, account
is taken of
(a) the strength of that policy as manifested by legislation orjudicial decisions,
(b) the likelihood that a refusal to enforce the term will further
that policy,
(c) the seriousness of any misconduct involved and the extent to
which it was deliberate, and
(d) the directness of the connection between the misconduct and
the term.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1981).
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"the child's best interests determine custody.""u At what point is
this determination to be made? Can the parties agree to that which
they believe will be in the best interest of the child, or is it always a
determination for the courts?
Public policy determinations need to be made at two points.
First, we need to look at the determination of custody as between
the father and the surrogate mother. Second, we need to look at the
adoption of the baby by the wife of the father. In order to deal with
the adoption, we must also look at the termination of the surrogate
mother's parental rights.
Custody

A.

An argument can be made that the parties themselves may
be able to determine the issue of custody, especially when we
consider that the arrangement is between someone who desperately wants a child and someone who merely wants, or is willing,
to bear the child. Without indicating in any sense that the birth
mother lacks the capacity or interest to warrant custody, the interest of the father and his wife may indicate strong capacity in
caring for the child. This, however, does not consider the possibility that the birth mother may change her mind once the baby is
born, and at that point she will have all the emotional stimulus
needed to demonstrate similar capacity. When the birth mother
wants custody, the fact that the father is desperate to have a biological 2 1 child does not make him more fit than the birth mother
to have sole custody.
Any pre-birth determination of custody would have to take
into account the overall circumstances of both the mother and
the father (and probably his wife) at the time of the birth of their
common offspring. A failure to consider the circumstances of the
parties would mean that there is no way to determine what is in
the best interests of the child, for the interests of the child are
inextricably connected to what the parents are capable of providing.2 4 At best, the agreement would have to be a good-faith proBaby .11, 109 N.J. at 453, 537 A.2d at 1256.
The reason that an individual chooses the surrogacy route is based on the
rejection of adoption as a viable alternative. In some cases it is because the procedures for adoption are cumbersome and lengthy. In others, it is because there is a
deep desire to have a biological child by one or both spouses. In the Baby Al decision we are told that the Sterns opted for surrogacy for the latter reason. See Baby
M, 109 N.J. at 413, 537 A.2d at 1235.
24 This is not to suggest that this is merely an economic decision; it is, rather, to
be made on the basis of all of the circumstances.
22
23
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25
jection over time of what the child's best interests would be.
A cynic might be tempted to suggest that the father will endeavor to find a woman whom he feels might be genetically fit to
be the surrogate mother of his child, but whom might not pass
the best-interests-of-the-child test in the eyes of a court. This is
especially true when we look at the court's determination that the
attempt to terminate the parental rights of the mother, in order
to allow the father's wife the opportunity to adopt the child, conflicts with New Jersey statutes that require a finding of unfitness
or intentional abandonment. 2" Any attempt to contractually determine the best interests of the child cannot be in good faith
since it does not take into consideration the possibility that the
surrogate mother may change her mind.2 7 Additionally, when we
analyze the projections made, we must do so in connection with
the actual conditions of the parties at the time that the determination concerning custody is made. Consequently, the most that
the parties can hope for is the conclusion that the court agrees
with their determination to the extent that a de novo review of
their circumstances concurs with the agreement of the parties.
That the agreement must be in good faith is merely a recognition
of a duty which has become a part of our modern law. 2"

B.

Adoption
The goal of the surrogacy arrangement is to have the father's

25 One might be tempted to conclude that this analysis is similar to that of a
liquidated damages clause in a contract. Liquidated damage agreements are upheld when they are understood to be good faith projections of damages. The parties arrive at an agreed figure based on the difficulty of establishing the exact
amount of damage caused by a future breach.
Section 356 of the Second Restatement of Contracts states:
(1) Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement but onlv at an amount that is reasonable in the light of the antici-

pated or actual loss caused by the breach and the difficulties of proof of

loss. A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is unenforceable on grounds of public policy as a penalty.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 (1981). The parties to a surrogate
contract would be held to a similar standard. The projections that need to be made
are difficult to calculate in .terms that would satisfy the best interests standard.
26 Baby .11, 109 N.J. at 427, 537 A.2d at 1242. (citing NJ. STAT. ANN. § 9:348(c)(1) iWest Supp. 1988)).
27 We need to keep in mind that the goal will always be to give custody to the
father. To state this as a conclusion means that everything that is agreed to is
geared to that end. How can an agreement which is geared to a specific goal be in
the best interests of the child? It is the goal which serves as the impulse for the
determination and not the child's best interests.
28 See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981); U.C.C. § 1-203
(1977).
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wife adopt the child born to the surrogate mother. There cannot
be an adoption by the father's wife without first terminating the
parental rights of the surrogate mother. New Jersey law articulates a number of conditions that must be satisfied before parental rights are terminated: "In order to terminate parental rights
under the private placement adoption statute, there must be a
finding of 'intentional abandonment or a very substantial neglect
or parental duties without a reasonable expectation of a reversal
of that conduct in the future.' "-"1
Furthermore, the legislature has provided the exclusive
means by which an individual may irrevocably give up her child
for adoption."' A failure to comply with the statutory requirements results in the mother's right to revoke her consent to the
adoption.' Private placement is not the proper procedure for an
irrevocable consent.3 - Consequently,
[t]he provision in the surrogacy contract, agreed to before
conception, requiring the natural mother to surrender custody
of the child without any right of revocation is one more indication of the essential nature of this transaction: the creation of a
contractual system of termination and adoption designed to
circumvent our statutes:
The agreement between the parties to the surrogacy arrangement
would have to set up a situation the aim of which would be to encourage the determination that the surrogate mother is deemed to
have abandoned or neglected the child. 4 Either of these alterna29 Baby M, 109 N.J. at 427, 537 A.2d 1242 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:348(c)(1) (West Supp. 1988)).
30 Id. at 432, 537 A.2d at 1245 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4C-23 (West 1981)).
The court stated that the Division of Youth and Family Services (DYFS)
is empowered to "take voluntary surrenders and releases of custody and
consent to adoption[s]" from parents, which surrenders, releases, or
consents "when properly acknowledged ... shall be valid and binding
irrespective of the age of the person giving the same, and shall be irrevocable except at the discretion of... IDYFS] or upon order of a court of
competent jurisdiction."
Id. (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4C-23 (West 1981)).
3 1[he Baby ,.11 court noted that stringent requirements for a voluntary irrevocable surrender to an approved agency are set forth in Section 9:2-16 of New Jersey
Statutes Annotated. Id. at 430-31, 537 A.2d at 1244-45 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 92-16 (West 1976)). Surrender may be set aside, however, "upon proof of fraud,
duress, or misrepresentation." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-16 (West 1976).
32 See Baby 1,.109 N.J. at 433-34, 537 A.2d at 1246 (citing Sees v. Baber, 74 N.J.
201, 213-15, 377 A.2d 628, 634-35 (1977). The Baby M court observed that "consent in a private placement adoption is not only revocable but, when revoked early
enough, irrelevant." Id. at 434, 537 A.2d at 1246.
33 Id. at 434, 537 A.2d at 1246.
34 The court stated:
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tives is clearly violative of public policy, since fostering one or the
other would be unacceptable contractual conditions. 5 The court
held as much when it stated:
In this case a termination of parental rights was obtained
not by proving the statutory prerequisites but by claiming the
benefit of contractual provisions. From all that has been
stated above, it is clear that a contractual agreement to abandon one's parental rights, or not to contest a termination action, will not be enforced in our courts. The Legislature
would not have so carefully, so consistently, and so substantially restricted termination of parental rights if it had intended to allow termination to be achieved by one short
sentence in a contract.
IV

CONCLUSION

As I have argued in this comment, I do not believe that a
surrogacy agreement can survive the public policy scrutiny discussed in the court's opinion. It is possible that parties who wish
to enter into this type of arrangement will be able to do so since
there is no way to police all activity. However, once a dispute
arises, the agreement will be meaningless. At that point, one of
the parties will seek the help of the courts, thus triggering the
principles of the Baby M decision.
At no point in this comment have I discussed my opinion
concerning the court's decision. I have intentionally chosen to
concentrate on the impact of the opinion. Some may agree with
the court, others I am sure will disagree. In the end, however, we
Our statutes, and the cases interpreting them, leave no doubt that
where there has been no written surrender to an approved agency or to
DYFS, termination of parental rights will not be granted in this state
absent a very strong showing of abandonment or neglect. That showing
is required in every context in which termination of parental rights is
sought, be it an action by an approved agency, an action by DYFS, or a
private placement adoption proceeding, even where the petitioning

adoptive parent is, as here, a stepparent.
Id. at 428, 537 A.2d at 1243 (citations omitted).

'15 The parties would not wish to avoid this result by simply having the natural

mother's legal relationship to the child kept intact. To do this would be contrary to
the purpose for which the parties entered into the agreement. Further, it is unlikely

that either party would wish to deal with the host of new problems raised by such an
arrangement.

';" Id. at 429, 537 A.2d at 1243-44. Clearly, the parties could also get around this
entire situation by arranging for the baby to be turned over to an adoption agency
first. This, however, leads to other problems, which in effect makes the surrogacy
arrangement meaningless. Or, is this perhaps the way to deal with surrogacy
generally?
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are all bound by this decision until the court chooses to overturn
itself. The court has thrown down the gauntlet to the legislature.
If surrogacy is to survive as an alternative to adoption, then the
legislature must act.

